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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE ACTION

600.0012/7-160

REVIEWED BY [illegible] DATE 7/15/81

DESP. NO.

FROM : Amembassy Helsinki

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON

REF :

RDS ☐ or XDS ☐ EXT. DATE

TS AUTH

REASON(S)

DATE July 1, 1960

ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS ☐

DECLASSIFIED ☑ RELEASABLE ☑

RELEASE DENIED ☐

JUL 01 1960

PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS

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	EUR-5	INFO OTHER	CIA-15, OSD-4, ARMY-4, NAVY-3, AIR-6, USIA-10, OCB-1, NSA-
	REC'D 7/4		

SUBJECT: Finnish Reply to June 2 Khrushchev Disarmament Letter

On June 20 Prime Minister Sukselainen replied to Soviet Premier Khrushchev's June 2 disarmament letter addressed "to all countries". News of Sukselainen's reply was published on June 28. (See Enclosure 1 for the text of Sukselainen's letter.)

Agreeing that progress on disarmament is more necessary than ever and expressing "appreciation" for "the endeavors of the Government of the USSR in this respect", Sukselainen referred Khrushchev to the Finnish statement at the 14th UNGA in which it was stated that "the Finnish Government has declared ... that it will be ready to support and, if possible, to facilitate all ... measures which promote real disarmament under proper control". Sukselainen added that "well balanced and realizable plans ... will receive the full support of the Finnish Government".

As in similar instances in the past, the Finnish Government avoided specific endorsement of the disarmament proposals accompanying Khrushchev's letter.

Communist Kansan Uutiset, the only major paper to comment, grudgingly conceded that "the Government's good wishes for a good cause must be greeted with satisfaction" but complained that Sukselainen's letter was "of the routine type and traditionally vague". The Communist paper said the Government could have gone further in the cause of peace by initiatives looking to the formation of a neutral Nordic bloc. "The U-2 incident revealed," stated the paper, "how dangerous the situation is for Finland's neutrality when NATO uses Scandinavian countries as bases".

For the Ambassador:

Harvey F. Nelson, Jr.
Second Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:
1. Unofficial translation of Sukselainen letter.

HFNelson,Jr:bk 7/1/60
REPORTER

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NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE OF ACTION / DIRECTIONS TO RM/

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PRIME MINISTER SUKSELAINEN'S ANSWER OF JUNE 20, 1960 TO PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S DISARMAMENT LETTER OF JUNE 2, 1960

Honorable Mr. Prime Minister:

I have carefully familiarized myself with your letter of June 2 addressed to me and the enclosed document presenting the proposals of the Government of the USSR for general and complete disarmament which the Government of the USSR desired to present to all countries for consideration. In your letter, Mr. Prime Minister, you have expressed the wish that the proposals made by the Soviet Government be met with understanding and support by the Finnish Government. The Finnish Government agrees with the opinion of the Government of the USSR that it has become even more necessary than before to achieve results in the field of disarmament and highly appreciates the endeavors of the Government of the USSR in this respect.

The attitude of the Finnish Government towards disarmament is clear and entirely favorable.

In the general debate at the 14th General Assembly Finland noted on the disarmament question, inter alia, that "the gauge for the future development of friendly and peaceful relations among nations will be to a great extent the progress which takes place in the field of disarmament. Here as well as elsewhere the Finnish Government has declared in many contexts that it will be ready to support and, if possible, to facilitate all such measures which promote real disarmament under proper control. By this we mean general disarmament, which is the main goal, aswell as such partial or gradual measures which can be considered steps towards the final goal. The Finnish delegation supports all measures which, by promoting disarmament, increase confidence among nations and the security of all countries.

Finland's attitude toward disarmament has been expressed also in the communique issued by the Nordic Foreign Ministers on April 26, 1960, after their meeting in Helsinki. It referred to the resolution on disarmament unanimously approved by the 14th General Assembly of the United Nations and noted with satisfaction that negotiations on this question had been started in the ten-power committee. The communique expressed the opinion that while a total solution is being sought as the main goal, one should strive for the practical solution of concrete problems in these negotiations.

I would like to assure you, Mr. Prime Minister, that, in accordance with its peace-seeking and neutral foreign policy, the Finnish Government is ready to support all efforts which would lead to real progress in the field of disarmament. Well-balanced and realizable plans and proposals aimed at this will receive the full support of the Finnish Government. The Finnish Government is conscious that the achievement of practical results in this question depends primarily on the great powers, a fact to which your disarmament document refers.

The Finnish Government sincerely hopes that a permanent solution dictated by common interests can be reached in this question which is so essentially important to the future of the whole mankind.

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Control 495

Rec'd January 3, 1950
6:01 p.m.

0115

FROM: Stockholm

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 3 January 3

SENT DEPARTMENT 3, REPEATED HELSINKI 1, MOSCOW 1.

Soviet note accusing Finland of sheltering 300 "Russian war criminals" featured by Stockholm press second as "political bomb" obviously designed to confuse Finns in forthcoming presidential election campaign and forestall Paasikivi reelection.

Editorially DAGENS NYHDMETER third observes that Finns had long regarded "war criminal" issue as closed chapter and that Russians would not resume "this detestable form of manhunt in countries which they can terrorize" but this was too optimistic presumption. "Soviet resembles Nazi Germany insofar as its interest in treaties and principles of justice is wholly subordinate to its efforts to assert its power politics invoke fright, foster general feeling of uncertainty and dependency--and the so-called extradition clause now employed to create such psychological and political shock in Finland." Paper asserts that democratic opinion in Finland would find it exceedingly difficult to accept new extraditions in violation of principles of both humanity and national independence. Even technically impossible for Finland comply with new Russian demand since perhaps majority of refugees have fortunately left Finland beyond reach of "executioners and slave drivers". Paper continues "those who have come to Sweden and remained here are naturally protected against any extradition and reprisals. Finnish authorities have previously had negative replies to representations (under Russian pressure) requesting 'repatriation'. Reply would be same if new request made. Sweden can

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[illegible] January 5, from Stockholm

Sweden can absolutely not support hunt for refugees conducted by Russians--on the contrary it is our duty openly to express freedom-loving peoples' abhorrence of barbarian traffic." Referring to possible effect on Finnish presidential election paper concludes that if Paasikivi remains firm Finns will unquestionably rally around him.

Stockholm's TIDNINGEN brands Soviet note more pretext for if "war criminal" argument had not been available Russians would have invented something else for sole purpose of announcing official Russian displeasure with present Finnish regime. Paper doubts that Russian action will affect presidential election to Communists' advantage on contrary should ensure Paasikivi's reelection. Yet Russian action confirms fears that Soviet attitude has lately changed to Finland's disadvantage and this is reality which must be heeded "although Finnish People's Democrats do not seem to have been willing enough to use in their domestic strife not only to defeat Communists but also to outwit non-Socialist majority.

SVENSKA DAGBLADET regards Soviet note as instruction to "wage war against Paasikivi's candidacy". Paper finds this new situation should prompt agrarian presidential candidate Kekkonen to withdraw his candidacy to secure Paasikivi's undisputed reelection. "At any rate, Juho Kusti may rest assured that his candidacy is backed not only by majority but also by best citizens of entire non-Communist Finnish people."

MATTHEWS

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Control 1103

Rec'd January 4, 1950
11:33 p.m.

FROM: Stockholm

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 12, January 4

SENT DEPARTMENT 12, REPEATED HELSINKI 2, MOSCOW 2.

Reference Embassy's press telegram 3, third Communist NY DAG makes issue of charge that "war criminals" having escaped from Finland are now sheltered in Sweden and asserts that Soviet note to Finland may thus have "consequences" even for Sweden. Paper told by Chief of Aliens Police in Goteborg that undisclosed number of "Russian citizens" registered as Ingrians* are living there as recognized political refugees after escape from Finland. Communist paper therefore approached Premier Erlander and Interior Minister Mossberg inquiring whether Swedish Government "considering Finlands exposed position" intends give names of "Russian citizens" from Finland granted asylum here as political refugees and whether government intends take any measures. Both ministers flatly refused reply. NY DAG interprets their refusal as clear indication that Swedish Government "for present" not willing to shed light on issue but adds "it is not for Sweden like Spain to become European asylum for all sorts of war criminals".

Semiofficial MORGON TIDNINGEN fourth commenting on Soviet note to Finland observes that whole affair incredible if not interpreted either great blunder on Russia's part or "cold-blooded attempt at interference in internal Finnish affairs." Paper however warns against exaggerating crisis which tends to be viewed more seriously in Stockholm than in Helsinki.

MATTHEWS

* As received. Verified upon request.

AGA:MW

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE F790005-1046

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Control 3162

Rec'd January 10, 1950
4:53 a.m.

FROM: Moscow

TO: Secretary of State 0423

DATED: 67, January 10

SENT DEPARTMENT 67. DEPARTMENT PASS HELSINKI 9.

Soviet press January 10 prints quarter column list war criminals announced December 31 note to Finnish Government with names heavy type followed by amount Finnish money brackets.

KNK

SUBJECT

NOTE: Relayed to Helsinki 8:10 a.m. 1/10/50 ST

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Control 3535

Rec'd January 10, 1950
5:08 p.m.

FROM: Stockholm

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 32 January 10.

0462

SENT DEPARTMENT 32, REPEATED HELSINKI 3.

Reference Embassy's press telegram 12, 4th.

PRAVDA article 9th violently attacking Finland and repeating demand for surrender of "war criminals" featured as lead story by DAGENS NYHETER but covered less conspicuously by other Stockholm papers, including Communist NY DAG. Swedish-Helsinki correspondents envisage compromise between Fagerholm Government and non-socialist opposition on contested domestic issues as consequence of Russian "propaganda onslaught". Finns reported as taking Russian attack serenely, but do not exclude possibility that Moscow may try tighten hold on Finland.

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Control 5702

Rec'd Jan. 15, 1950
9:37 a.m.

FROM: Moscow

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 132, January 15, 2 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 132; DEPARTMENT PASS HELSINKI 13.

Though Soviet press continues daily sniping at Finland, we do not regard Kremlin's current pressure campaign as more ominous than last summer's strike action, which subsequently failed (EMBTEL 2135, August 23). Since then there have been occasional propaganda blasts from Moscow, in particular October 24 and December 13 PRAVDA articles (EMBTELS 2662, October 24 and 3093 December 13), inter alia charging violations of both peace and 1948 mutual aid treaties and branding 1939-40 war of defense as "senseless adventure" Finland on behalf foreign imperialist interests.

While December 31 diplomatic protest is in itself somewhat more serious that mere Soviet press propaganda, Embassy observes note (EMBTEL 2, January 1) itself charged only mutual aid pact violated, additional allegation that peace treaty also involved being added only by January 9 Leontyev PRAVDA article (EMBTEL 50, January 9- compare statement Finance Minister Poland given last paragraph Warsaw's 17 to Department January 5). As emphasized EMBTEL 790, March 30, Soviets would presumably find it difficult to intervene unilaterally on peace treaty charges, and we share Helsinki's doubts that this latest Soviet move constitutes build-up for denunciation of mutual aid pact (Helsinki's 9 to Department January 4).

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JAN 18 1950

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Suggest rather that current "heat" from Moscow reflect:

(A) Kremlin's continuing dislike Fagerholm government (and indeed any non-Communist Finnish regime);

(B) Another typical crude and ill-conceived move by Soviets likely to influence development in question (in this case, coming presidential election) in manner just reverse of what Kremlin desires.

KIRK

DM:MM

NOTE: Relayed to Helsinki 1/15/50, 10:10 a.m. JP.

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Control 7160

Rec'd January 18, 1950
4:29 p.m.

Action: EUR
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FROM: Moscow

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 173, January 18.

SENT DEPARTMENT 173, DEPARTMENT PASS HELSINKI 15.

PRAVDA January 18 prints 1-1/2 column article signed "N" under title "Dangerous Counsels of False Friends" on question Soviet "war criminals" Finland. Noting no explanation Finnish acts in violation of peace and mutual aid treaties despite "more than two weeks", alleges number "friends", especially US and Swedish reactionaries, hastened to help Finns find answer. Quoting numerous Swedish press items this and earlier Finno-Soviet questions, article closes: "Possible believe, however, Finnish people has already learned by its bitter experience distinguish true friends and false counselors, friendship with whom will and can bring Finland nothing good".

KIRK

RSP:LPA

Note: Relayed to Helsinki, 4:35 p.m. 1/18/50 MB.

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Control 1523

Rec'd January 27, 1950
3:06 p. m.

FROM: London

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 482, January 27, 5 p. m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 482, REPEATED MOSCOW 35, HELSINKI 3.

Re Finnish apprehension of Soviet interference in Finnish politics prior to election February 16 (INTEL January 19, 4 a. m.) UK Foreign Office observes this inconsistent with Soviet peace drive. Also points out absence of Finnish-Soviet Commercial Treaty, Finn delegation having been sitting in Moscow many weeks without having been received and probably no action forthcoming before election, if then. Believes Finns badly need Soviet wheat and oil and if they cannot get it will probably apply to US; also that Soviets respect Finn toughness as displayed in Finnish war and in February 1948 when despite Soviet pressure on both Czechs and Finns, latter threw out Communist Minister Interior who stayed out.

Foreign Office concludes with opinion Soviets will continue to talk rough but unlikely to commit any major acts against Finns.

HOLMES

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JAN 30 1950

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TO: Department of State

EUR INDEX

660e.61/1-3050

FROM: LONDON 473 Jan 30, 1950 1 enclosure

REF: Dept. Intel Jan. 19, 4 A.M., Embtel 482 of Jan. 27.

SUBJECT: "Soviet Pressure on Finland".

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660e.61/1-3050

Enclosed is an article from The Economist of January 28, 1950, entitled "Soviet Pressure on Finland".

This is forwarded as possibly interesting supplemental information in view of the Department's Intel of January 19, 4 A.M., and Embtel 482 of January 27, 1950.

John H. Bruins
Counselor of Embassy

Enclosure:

Copy of article "Soviet Pressure on Finland" from The Economist of January 28, 1950.

cc: AmEmbassy Moscow

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Enclosure to
LONDON 478, Jan.

FW005-FIN

SOVIET PRESSURE ON FINLAND

"The most reliable guide to the general state of Soviet-Finnish relations is the attitude of the Russians to the trade talks, which are held between the two countries in Moscow each winter, and the nature of the commercial agreement then concluded. This is a much surer indication of whether the Kremlin intends to make things awkward for the Finns than the outpourings of Soviet propaganda and their reflection by the Finnish Communist press. Towards the end of 1948, for example, while the Finnish negotiators were being quite well treated in Moscow, the Finnish Communists, echoing and echoed by the blatant propagandists of Moscow Radio and the Litteraturnaya Gazeta, were conducting against the young Social Democrat Government a campaign of abusive threats. The obvious inference seemed to be that the days of Mr. Fagerholm's administration were numbered, but it still holds office and will continue to do so until the middle of next month, when the election of a new President necessitates its dissolution.

This year, however--and for the first time--the Finnish negotiators, who have been in Moscow since the end of November, are having a much harder time. The head of the delegation suddenly returned to Helsinki early in January, and another leading member came back last week. Presumably each of these visits marked a critical stage in the negotiations; but they still drag on. The Communist press, in this instance more in step with Moscow's actions, uses the occasion to remind us that the Social Democrat Government is now so discredited that it cannot even conclude a normal commercial treaty.

There is no doubt that this time the Kremlin is bent on changing the pattern of Finnish politics to its own advantage. There is equally no doubt that the Finns will resist, for they have rejected the Soviet protest about the treatment of "war criminals" practically in toto. And to suggest that the low vote for Mr Paasikivi in the Presidential elections is evidence of cold feet as well as cold weather is to misread the Finnish situation as seriously as it was misread when, soon after the Prague coup of 1948, the Russians wanted--without result--an alliance with the Finns. Mr. Paasikivi has no more chance of getting a thumping Labour vote in Finland than has Mr. Churchill in England. With many Socialists abstaining, it is not surprising that the Communist percentage of the vote went up. What is surprising is that the Communists, with only about 58 per cent of the electorate voting, as against 75 per cent in the general elections of 1945, have not made greater comparative gains. Their total vote in fact fell from 372,000 to 317,000. But the figure for the Social Democrats also dropped, by almost a third, from 496,000 to 329,000. Such a setback will immensely complicate the formation of the new Government that takes office with the new President."

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PER M. JERABEK - EUR
FOI 810328

FROM: London

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 636, February 3, 7 p. m.

Supplementing EMBTEL 482 January 27 re Soviet pressure on Finland. Embassy learns economic intelligence department of UK Foreign Office has prepared intelligence study on Finnish economic situation to ascertain whether failure of Finnish-Soviet treaty negotiations would be disastrous to Finnish economy. Latter needs wheat, oil, fertilizer, steel, other metals. Since Finns have no dollars paper assumes would be difficult to obtain needs from US. Entire Finnish needs estimated at upon over $50 million annually. Paper concludes treaty would be convenient but in event negotiations fail and Finns move quickly they could probably obtain their small requirements from European sources and therefore result would not necessarily be disastrous.

Paper does not cover subject of whether UK particularly interested or able to supply Finnish needs.

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TO: Department of State 660o.61/2-750

FROM: MOSCOW 128 February 7, 1950 1 Enclosure

REF: EMBASSY'S TELEGRAM 173, January 18, 1950

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF SOVIET PRESS ARTICLE CRITICIZING SWEDISH "ADVICE" TO FINLAND RE SOVIET WAR CRIMINALS

Enclosed is a full text translation of a 1½ column article, signed "N", which appeared in IZVESTIYA on January 18, 1950. The article, headlined "Dangerous Counsels of False 'Friends'", states that "Swedish press and right-wing Swedish politicians" are advising Finland to refuse the Soviet demand that she hand over certain Soviet war criminals alleged to be living in Finland, and quotes several articles on this subject which appeared recently in the Swedish press. It asserts this is bad advice as it "could not but result in a deterioration in Soviet-Finnish relations, which is the aim being systematically pursued by the reactionary circles in Sweden", which would be "harmful primarily to the interests of Finland". The article asserts the Swedish attitude is a "reflection of the anti-democratic policy of protecting war criminals which is also carried on by the Swedish government itself", and an attempt to "influence the course of the Finnish presidential elections."

For the Ambassador,

Walworth Barbour
Minister-Counselor

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PER M. JERABEK - EUR
FOI 810328

Enclosure:

Soviet Press Article

Copies to Helsinki, Stockholm

RKirk/gl 7/3/50

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IZVESTIYA

DANGEROUS COUNSELS OF FALSE "FRIENDS"

By N.

More than two weeks have passed since the day when the Soviet Government asked the Finnish Government why it had not as yet surrendered the 56 war criminals to the police authorities, thereby violating both the Peace Treaty signed in 1947 and the Soviet-Finnish Treaty signed in 1948. More than two weeks it appears is not enough time for the Finnish Government to answer this question despite the fact that various "friends" and "well wishers" hasten to help the Finnish Government to find a suitable reply. The American protectors of the Finnish reactionaries who have become accustomed to slapping the Finnish ruling circles on the back in a patronising manner and pretending to be "friends" of Finland, are not alone in displaying special activeness in this respect. The Swedish press and Swedish politicians from the right-wing camp who do not cease to offer the Finnish Government their counsels and their protection, are also slapping the Finnish ruling circles on the back in a patronising manner.

The Swedish ruling circles deliver such counsels at the present time in connection with the declaration of the Soviet Government on the 31st of December 1949 concerning the surrender of war criminals hiding in Finland. Moreover the leit-motif of all such utterances by the Swedish press, which expresses the frames of mind and desires of the Swedish ruling circles, is the consciously false and importunely repeated affirmation that there are no war criminals whatsoever in Finland, that the question of their surrender has already been long since "exhausted" and that finally, in the opinion of Swedish circles, the war criminals in Finland "one must suppose will never be found". It must be clear to everyone that this means nothing other than counsel to the Finnish Government to embark upon the path of an unsubtantiated denial of the facts, and upon the path of violation of the Peace Treaty.

Such a newspaper as the "Dagens Nyheter" which sings the American tune, openly incites the Finnish Government to refuse to surrender to the Soviet Union the war criminals who are hiding in Finland with the connivance of the Finnish authorities. In its leading article this, if one call it such, organ of the press calls upon Kekkonen to "stand firm" on his ground in this question, in other words not to fulfil the obligations laid upon the Finnish Government by the Peace Treaty.

The Swedish semi-official organ "Morgontidningen", the organ of the right-wing Social-Democrat Party, not taking into consideration the fact that the demand for the surrender of war criminals is directly provided for by article 9 of the Peace Treaty with Finland and that the Peace Treaty must be fulfilled unconditionally, advises the Finnish Government to endeavour to engage in "negotiations" on this question with the Soviet Union, hoping under cover of such "negotiations" to succeed in evading the honest fulfilment of its obligations under the Peace Treaty.

One of the most reactionary Swedish newspapers, the "Stockholms-Tidningen" endeavours to make out that certain of the Soviet citizens who betrayed their native land in war time have already at the present time allegedly received Finnish citizenship and possess Finnish passports and that consequently they are not affected by the Peace Treaty. It is well known however, what is the meaning of these

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IZVESTIYA (Cont'd):

so-called "passports" issued to war criminals especially in order that it might be easier for the criminals to avoid being brought to trial, and in order that it might be easier for the Finnish authorities to conceal them. But such machinations with passports cannot save the war criminals from the punishment they deserve and they cannot remove the responsibility for the concealment of these criminals from the Finnish authorities. The counsels of Swedish "friends" who seek for all possible means of "helping" the Fagerholm Government to break the Peace Treaty and to evade the necessity of the Finnish Government's fulfilling of the obligations laid upon it under the Treaty, can have no good consequences. Such counsels of the Swedish "friends" are of course pleasing to the American and other imperialists but they are not in accordance with the interests of Finland nor with those of Sweden . They are dangerous, as the false "counsellors" themselves are dangerous. The counsels are dangerous because any non-fulfilment by the Finnish authorities of the just demands of the Soviet Union based on the Peace Treaty and the Treaty of Friendship places Finland in the position of a violator of these treaties. They are dangerous also because such violations by the Finnish Government of its obligations cannot but result in a deterioration in Soviet-Finnish relations which, as is well known, is the aim which is being systematically pursued by the reactionary circles in Sweden and their Social-Democrat parasites from the ruling circles who are pushing the Finnish Government on to a path which is ruinous for Finland, without taking into consideration the fact that a deterioration in relations with the Soviet Union is harmful primarily to the interests of Finland.

We would do well to remember that the Swedish ruling circles offered their dangerous and harmful "counsels" to Finland many times in the past also. In 1947 the Swedish semi-official press endeavoured in all ways possible to discredit the Peace Treaty in the eyes of Finns. In 1948 the Swedish press opposed the Soviet-Finnish Treaty of friendship, collaboration and mutual aid and the notorious "Dagens Nyheter" went so far as to say that this Treaty would allegedly bring about the "ruin of Finland". In 1948 also the reactionary Stockholm press loudly greeted the release from prison of the Finnish war criminals, Tanner and Linkomies, representing them as "innocent victims". In 1949 in connection with the release from prison of Riuti, one of the chief war criminals, "Morgontidningen" the organ of the Social-Democrat Party, delivered an openly provocative sermon to the rulers of Finland as to how the protection of war criminals should be carried out. "On the conclusion of peace" this government party newspaper declared hypocritically, "Finland undertook to punish its war criminals but it did not undertake the repeal of the right of pardoning".

The Swedish right-wing Social Democrats thus cynically recommended that the Finnish Government should disregard and violate the Peace Treaty with the aid of the so-called "pardoning", and this was done by the Finnish Government which was amenable to such counsels and which released such malicious war criminals as Tanner, Riuti and others from punishment. Now when

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FY80 005-2081

IZVESTIYA (Cont'd)

it is a question of the punishment of war criminals liable to responsibility for their misdeeds before a Soviet court, the Finnish authorities have found a still simpler method of letting these criminals go unpunished; simply by hiding them on their territory and kindly supplying them with false Finnish passports.

The attitude of the Swedish ruling circles towards the question of the surrender by Finland of war criminals is far from being accidental. It is a reflection of the anti-democratic policy of protecting war criminals which is also carried on by the Swedish Government itself. The Swedish press does not hide the fact now that among the war criminals on Swedish territory there are many who arrived in Sweden from Finland with the knowledge of the Finnish and Swedish authorities, one might even say, in accordance with a deal between the Finnish and Swedish authorities.

It is not by chance therefore that the Swedish ruling circles are making great efforts to help the Fagerholm Government with their counsels to extract itself from a difficult situation. In this process they do not stop at direct interference in the domestic affairs of Finland, apparently considering the present moment to be sufficiently favourable in order to influence the course of the presidential elections in Finland. With this aim in view they openly oppose some candidates and openly support others, calling upon Finns to vote for those who are the most pleasing to the Swedish bourgeoisie. In so doing they pretend to be the friends of Finland but in actual fact they pursue aims which have nothing in common with the interests of the Finnish people.

One may suppose, however, that the Finnish people has already learnt by its own bitter experience to distinguish between sincere friends and false counsellors friendship with whom does not have and cannot have any good consequences for Finland.

(1½-columns)(Full text) IZVESTIYA 18.1.50

MOST PAPERS

ELECTIONS TO THE COLLEGIUM OF THE ELECTORS OF THE PRESIDENT OF FINLAND

HELSINKI 17th January TASS. Yesterday was the first day of the elections to the collegium of the electors of the President of Finland. Newspapers note that the activeness of the electors was considerably less than on the first day of the elections of the deputies to the Sejm in the summer of 1948...

The newspaper "Työkansan Sanomat" draws attention to the fact that certain manufacturers endeavoured to delay workers with overtime work in order to deprive them of the possibility of taking part in the voting...

HELSINKI 17th January TASS. The elections to the collegium of the electors of the president ended today at 8 p.m. in Finland. Preliminary data concerning the number of people who took part in the voting indicate the comparably low activeness of the voters. According to preliminary data, 65 - 67% of the total number of voters balloted in Helsinki.

(36 lines)(Condensed text) MOST PAPERS (Izv.) 18.1.50

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DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION

FW0005-2005

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CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

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Info:
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Control 5635

Rec'd February 12, 1950
10:54 a.m.

FROM: Helsinki

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 80, February 12, noon.

SENT DEPARTMENT 80, REPEATED MOSCOW 19.

Marquis Childs alarmist article, about diplomatic information reaching Washington that Moscow planned denounce "peace treaties" with Finland, set spate rumors circulating Helsinki, after reportedly sensational treatment Stockholm press morning 10th. Moreover, absence Soviet Minister Savonenkov from Prime Minister Fagerholm's dinner evening 10th for Chiefs of Mission added to rumors. (Actually Savonenkov had telephoned Foreign Office 2 p.m., 10th, that he had fallen ill and regretted inability attend dinner, invitation to which he had earlier accepted. All satellite Chiefs of Mission attended.) An informant, of questionable reliability went to several other diplomatic missions here recently and provided them with stories about malevolent Soviet intentions regarding Finland. This is not first time he has purveyed such material to them and his latest tales increased number of rumors in circulation.

With approach February 15 election President by electoral college, numerous Finns expressed apprehension Soviet Union might make serious move to dissuade electors from re-electing Paasikivi. Without awaiting exhaustion by importer of all routine possibilities of appeal, Counselor of Soviet Legation week ago orally requested Foreign Office to arrange restoration some hundred meters cut in first review by censors from Soviet picture WAR AND PEACE as defamatory some Western nations and their leaders. This is only official Soviet move here that can be interpreted as attempt influence decision electoral college. (Place of stalled trade negotiations at Moscow in election picture discussed LEGTEL 17 to Moscow and 76 to Department.) Soviets still have not taken exception to

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PER M. JERABEK - EUR
FOI 810328

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10—55716-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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FRUS005-2006

exception to January 17 Finnish rebuttal of Soviet New Years eve aide memoire alleging official Finnish protection war criminals and traitors in violation peace treaty and friendship pact. No indication here Finns would jettison Paasikivi.

CHASE

RSP:LPA

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SECURITY: RESTRICTED ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ PRIORITY: AIR POUCH

660e.61/3-750
NR 660e.611
961.61

TO: Department of State

FROM: MOSCOW 261 March 7, 1950

REF: Embassy's Unclassified Telegram 732, March 2, 1950

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF SOVIET PRESS REPORT OF SOVIET REPLY TO PREVIOUS FINNISH NOTE RE SOVIET CHARGES OF HARBORING WAR CRIMINALS IN FINLAND

For Dept. use only. RECD March 14

ACTION: EUR

INFO: RGR EE-one NE

EUR INDEX

There are enclosed in translation copies of an announcement on the above subject appearing in the Soviet press on March 2, 1950.

The Soviet reply rejects the earlier Finnish note as not in accord with the facts of the case and reiterates the original charge that the Finnish Government, in harboring Soviet-citizen war criminals on Finnish soil, is violating the Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, with the additional charge that the Finnish action also violates the Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Peace.

While publication of this communication appears to indicate an intention to continue pressure on Finland, its closing paragraph, stating that the Finnish reply is "unsatisfactory", is not by Soviet standards particularly belligerent, and publication has not been followed up as yet by any really intensive press campaign.

Walworth Barbour
Charge d'Affairs a.i.

Enclosure:
Soviet Press Article

cc: Helsinki

FSArmstrong/gl 3/6/50

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FILED APR 4 1950

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660e.61/3-750

DECLASSIFIED 6/13/78
PER M. JERABEK - EUR
FOI 810328

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P79B005-2000

SUMMARY FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO BE QUOTED

JOINT PRESS READING SERVICE

MOSCOW DAILY PRESS SUMMARY SECTION A

No. 61. Thursday, 2nd March, 1950

MAIN FEATURES

THE REPLY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT

GRATITUDE DANISH STYLE (Trud)

NOTE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA TO THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT

REPORT OF KLEMENT GOTTWALD AT A PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

TOGLIATTI'S ARTICLE ON THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS IN BRITAIN

IN THE STRUGGLE FOR BREAD AND PEACE: CERTAIN RESULTS OF THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATIONS OF TRADE UNIONS (Trud)

+++ +++ +++

INTERNATIONAL

ALL PAPERS

THE REPLY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT

On Jan. 21, Mr. K. Sundstrom, the Finnish Minister, handed A.A. Gromyko, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, the Finnish Government's reply to the statement made by the Government of the USSR on Dec. 31, 1949 concerning war criminals in Finland who are Soviet citizens.

In its statement, the Finnish Government, in essence, evaded a reply to the question raised by the Soviet Government as to why it has not yet placed these war criminals at the disposal of the Soviet authorities. In this connection the Finnish Government stated that, allegedly, it knew nothing of the presence in Finland of war criminals who are Soviet citizens apart from 4 persons who are detained by the Finnish authorities.

On Feb. 28, A.A. Gromyko, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, received the Finnish Minister, Mr. K. Sundstrom, and delivered to him the Soviet Government's reply to the statement of the Finnish Government dated Jan. 21.

In the reply of the Soviet Government, it is stated that the Finnish Government's assertion that it knows nothing of the presence on Finnish territory of more than 300 war criminals who are Soviet citizens is without any

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ALL PAPERS (Cont'd)

foundation. It is sufficient to recall that in the communiqué from the main headquarters of the Finnish Army dated Feb. 5, 1947 and in the list distributed on June 30, 1947 to all Finnish police authorities, more than 350 war criminals were enumerated from among Soviet citizens in Finland, who served during the war in the intelligence and information departments of the General Headquarters and also in the third and sixth volunteer battalions and in other units of the Finnish Army, i.e. who committed treason against the Soviet Union. The Allied Control Commission has repeatedly demanded the extradition of all these persons. The Finnish Government thus had a full opportunity to detain these criminals without allowing them to flee the country. However, since Dec. 15, 1947 it has delivered to the Soviet authorities only 24 of these persons in all. These facts provide full grounds for asserting that all these persons who are charged by the Soviet Government as war criminals are known to the Finnish Government and are being sheltered by Finnish authorities from extradition to the Soviet authorities.

As regards the list of 56 war criminals, it follows from the reply of the Finnish Government that of the criminals mentioned in it, only four persons have been detained by the Finnish authorities and allegedly, 4 persons have been handed over to the Soviet authorities. Of the remainder, the Finnish Government reported that 24 of them had fled the country and, allegedly, that it had no information concerning 22.

As a result of a check on this information concerning the 24 persons alleged to have fled from Finland, it was established that the information communicated at one time by the Finnish authorities to the Allied Control Commission regarding the flight of some of these persons was based on facts which had not been checked, since later the Finnish police authorities were compelled to announce a search for these persons, as being in Finland. For example, this was the position in regard to Petrilyainen, Kokkonen, Nifantiev, Remshu, Fofanov. As regards the 4 criminals alleged to have been handed over to the Soviet authorities, a check concerning 2 of them has not confirmed the fact of their extradition to the Soviet authorities. Among the 22 criminals of whom the Finnish Government reports that, allegedly, it has no information, there are 18 intelligence agents, 2 former members of the police in occupied Soviet territory and 2 officials of the information department of the General Headquarters of the Finnish Army. The list of Soviet citizens living in Finland sent to the Allied Control Commission on Oct. 21, 1946 stated the precise addresses of a whole group of these criminals (Larinen, Levkov, Simonov and others). Thus, the assertion that the whereabouts of these 22 persons were unknown to the Finnish Government is without any foundation.

The Finnish Government has attempted to refute the statement of the Soviet Government concerning the issue by the Finnish authorities of forged documents to some criminals, but it itself, in its reply, was compelled to admit that "a few such cases took place before the signing of the armistice agreement and immediately afterwards". In the list of criminals distributed to Finnish police institutions on June 30, 1947 it was stated that many criminals "in the service of the Finnish defence forces or who hid after the conclusion of the armistice have changed their surname", and "many false identity cards have been brought to light by means of a list drawn up according to year of birth".

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ALL PAPERS (Cont'd) All these facts, the Soviet Government's reply states, are evidence that the Finnish Government, contrary to its assurances of a desire to fulfil its obligations under the Peace Treaty, is evading the fulfilment of its obligations, violating the Peace Treaty and the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. The Soviet Government stated that in view of the above the Finnish Government's reply is unsatisfactory.
(1 Column) (Full Text) ALL PAPERS 2.3.50.

TRUD GRATITUDE DANISH-STYLE
By A. K-v.

The Marshallised Danish papers have earnt unenviable repute. Being slavishly zealous towards their trans-oceanic masters, they daily give their readers helpings of the most shameless falsehood and slander regarding the Soviet Union. For example, the attempt of the Danish newsmen to concoct a slanderous article about the Soviet Union, calling this concoction a statement made by the Danish woman chess player, Larsen, is well known to Soviet readers. When Larsen, the victim of this swindle, demanded the publication of a denial stating that she had said nothing of the sort and did not intend to be a purveyor of slander against the Soviet Union to the Danish papers, her denial was cynically refused. Quite justly she described such conduct on the part of the Danish newsmen as a base act.

Recently a Danish paper made a new sally against Soviet people. As grounds for this, it chose the rescue by Soviet frontier guards of Danish sailors who had been shipwrecked.

In October last, a severe storm was raging in the Baltic. A kilometre from the Soviet coast, the Danish two-masted schooner "Joseph" was cast up on submerged rocks by the storm. For four days it was impossible to approach the schooner.

On Oct. 25 the schooner gave the "distress" signal. Despite the storm, at the risk of their lives, Soviet people set out to save the crew of the schooner. In the attempt approach the schooner, the boat was overturned by a huge wave. Soviet frontier guards, 2 sailors and 1 local fisherman peri[illegible] the raging sea during the rescue of the crew of the schooner which had come to grief.

After the disaster which they had experienced, the Danish sailors and the woman and child[illegible] with them rested for 8 days in a Soviet frontier village. Soviet people afforded them the hospitality characteristic of our people. On Nov. 7 the Danes left for Finland via Leningrad on their way to their own country. On parting from the Soviet frontier guards, the Danish seamen expressed the warmest gratitude for their rescue and for the assistance, and warmly thanked the Soviet people for the hospitality afforded to them. On arrival in Denmark, the captain of the schooner told representatives of the Danish press of this.

But evidently it is forbidden to speak well of Soviet people in Denmark today. In order to erase the impression made by the captain's story, a Danish paper wrote a heinous libel on the Soviet frontier guards. It found no words to tell its readers of the courage of the Soviet frontier

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MAR 3 1 1950
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TRUD (Cont'd)

guards not a word of regret was said regarding the death of the Soviet seamen and frontier guards. The whole article turned out to be devoted - to the bill which was sent to the Danes for payment. The article is called "A Russian Bill for Hospitality". The sub-heading says: "The Strange Experiences of a Danish Captain Behind the 'Iron Curtain' Become an Expensive Pleasure".

In this libellous article, the paper also uses the text of the Soviet Note sent to the Danish Legation in Moscow and obligingly sent to the paper from the Danish Foreign Ministry.

The whole of this story of the bill proved to be in reality a routine falsehood of the Danish newsmen.

The Soviet frontier guards and seamen who sacrificed their lives while rescuing the Danes who were shipwrecked presented no bill, although they have the legal right to do so. Moreover, they not only presented no bill for the rescue but they also presented no bill for the 8 days stay with the frontier guards of the crew of the schooner, although they had a right to do this too.

For what and by whom was the bill presented? The bill was presented by the official Soviet authorities for railway tickets for the Danes from Tallin to the Finnish frontier, for the use of a bus and taxis, for food, bought in the shops, and for rooms in hotels. The captain of the schooner who made this expenditure undertook to repay. The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on receiving the bill, recognised it as fair and made the payment. Nevertheless, the presentation of the bill served as grounds for the slanders of the Danish hack-writers who have lost the elementary conception of simple human gratitude.

Honest Danes should be ashamed of such people.

(¾ Column) (Full Text) TRUD 2.3.50.

IZVESTIYA

DEMONSTRATION OF UNEMPLOYED IN COPENHAGEN

COPENHAGEN March 1. TASS. A demonstration of unemployed has taken place in Copenhagen. The unemployed marched to the Riksdag, beside which the meeting took place, with slogans: "Everyone has the right to work", "Give us work!", "Down with Militarisation!". On behalf of 150,000 unemployed, the demonstrators sent the Government a deputation to convey the demand expressed in a resolution adopted at an all-Danish conference of unemployed in the town of Vejle. However, not a single member of the Government received the deputation.

(13 Lines) (Full Text) IZVESTIYA 2.3.50.

SOME PAPERS

NEW INCREASE IN SUGAR PRICES IN NORWAY

OSLO March 1. TASS. The Norwegian papers report an increase of 20 per cent. in the price of sugar for industrial manufacture, which is impending in the near future. In this connection a new increase is expected in the price of confectionery in addition to the increase made in February.

(7 Lines) (Full Text) SOME PAPERS (Trud) 2.3.50.

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(13)

FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

EUR INDEX

SECURITY: UNCLASS ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ PRIORITY: AIR POUCH

TO: Department of State

FROM: MOSCOW 265 March 11, 1950

REF: ELD

F790005-1037

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF CONDENSED TRANSLATION OF LITERARY GAZETTE ARTICLE ON PAASIKIVI

The enclosed article which appeared in the Literary Gazette on February 14, 1950 may be of interest in connection with recent Soviet press coverage of the Finnish presidential elections and continuing Soviet pressure on Finland through official charges and demands regarding Soviet citizen "war criminals" allegedly harbored in Finland.

Walworth Barbour
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

Enclosure:
As Stated Above

cc: Helsinki

FSArmstrong:l 3/7/50

DECLASSIFIED 6/13/78
PER M. JERABEK - EUR
FOI 810328

ACTION COPY — DEPARTMENT OF STATE
The action office must return this permanent record copy to DC/R files with an endorsement of action taken.

F7D005-1072

7. HORRORS OF AMERICAN HOSPITALS

"Treatment exclusively for the wealthy" - such is the basis of the whole of the medical service in the USA. Millions of Americans of various ages are suffering from different kinds of diseases and illnesses. But their scanty means do not permit them to enjoy medical aid.

The zealous adherents of the "American way of life", being unable to deny this, assure us that allegedly there are city hospitals in the USA for those who do not dispose of sufficient means. The "New York Post" has described the activity of these "medical institutions" in detail in a series of articles briefly, but expressively entitled "Horrors of New York Hospitals".

"The city hospitals", states one of these articles, "are always overburdened, the service personnel in them is coarse and inattentive; in any one of the hospitals the casual visitor may observe scenes which will make him shudder with horror. The reason being that the authorities allot insufficient funds for the maintenance of medical institutions"...

The situation is indeed a monstrous one. But it definitely does not alarm anyone in the ruling circles of the USA, who are spending 71% of the budget on preparations for a new war, and only 2% on all social needs.

(½ col.) (Excerpts) "LITERARY GAZETTE" No. 14, 1950

8. THE "PAASAKIVI LINE" WITHOUT A SMOKE-SCREEN

By Antti Timonen

...A great deal is said and written at the present time in Finland about the "Paasakivi line". Especially on the eve of the Presidential elections a whole crowd of corrupt scribblers and lying radio announcers, former and present war criminals, was mobilised in order to cry with one voice: "The Paasakivi line is a line of friendship and good-neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union. The Paasakivi line is a policy for the further democratisation of the country", etc., etc...

On New Year's Eve the Finnish President in a short broadcast succeeded in accomplishing miracles of self-praise. According to Paasakivi's words it appears that it was actually who gave the country independence, peace and friendship with the Soviet Union. On the following day the newspapers of all the reactionary parties took up the refrain: This is what the "Paasakivi line" amounts to!

However, no matter how thick the fog spread around this verbose "Paasakivi line" nevertheless the true positions occupied by the present President of Finland penetrate through it clearly...

During the second world war Paasakivi showed his true colours, the colours of an enemy of the Soviet Union and of Finnish democracy. Paasakivi's speech in Messukhalli on March 13, 1942 is still remembered in Finland. At that time he chose the most solemn words to express his "militant desire to fight together with mighty Germany". He cried:

"Thanks to the brilliant victories of our army the Finnish state authority has declared the lamentable Moscow peace of 1940 (which he himself signed! - A.T.) to be invalid. The Moscow peace is only a dark page in the history of Finland".

DECLASSIFIED

8(cont'd) Now it is not 1942 but 1950. Now Paasakivi understands that this is not the time to demonstrate his political views and his line so openly as he did in Massukhalli. Now the Coalition Party, the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party headed by Tanner and Fagerholm and the other bourgeois parties are compelled to conceal this line from the people with a smoke-screen of pompous but false phrases. They cry in every possible way that it was Paasakivi who achieved friendship between the Finnish and Soviet peoples. But the working people of Finland understand: Paasakivi did everything possible to aggravate relations with the Soviet Union in order to save the war criminals Riuti, Tanner and others from just punishment.

Finnish reactionary newspapers recently published a report received from America which enumerates the countries where at the bidding of Wall Street, Communists have been removed from the government. Paasakivi may consider as his highest praise the fact that Finland has been included in this list.

By publishing this list the Finnish reactionary press thereby acknowledged that the composition of the Finnish Government is now determined not in Helsinki but in Washington. The American press constantly reminds us that the White House is satisfied with the policy of the present Finnish Government and Finnish newspapers consider it an honour to receive these praises.

Paasakivi strived so that the foreign policy of Finland should follow a course pleasing to Wall Street. The foreign policy of Paasakivi is constantly oriented towards countries connected by the noose of the aggressive Atlantic Pact. 87% of the foreign trade of the country, despite the interests of Finnish economy, falls to Western countries...

Pekkala had conducted a foreign and domestic policy in the interests of Finland itself and of the Finnish people. Thanks to the energetic actions of his government fascist organisations were liquidated in Finland, fascist propaganda was persecuted and the organisers of secret stores of arms and other war criminals were brought to justice.

Now all these fascist organisations which were dissolved, are renewing their activity under the guise of all possible kinds of hunting and sports societies...

Pekkala's Government did much in order to surrender to the Soviet Union the traitors and betrayers concealed in Finland. Fagerholm's Government concealed war criminal permitted them to change their names, to obtain Finnish citizenship or aided them to flee abroad.

Under Pekkala's Government there were almost no unemployed people in Finland. There are now about 60,000 unemployed. In the middle of the year 1948 when Pekkala's Government was removed the production index was 137. At the end of last year it was 126.

Such is the line of Paasakivi, Tanner and Fagerholm without its smoke-screen. It is a line for the crushing of democracy and the revival of fascism, for a struggle against the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy and for support of the Anglo-American instigators of a new war.

The progressive camp of Finland which has nominated M. Pekkala as its candidate for President of the Republic, is fighting against the anti-people's policy of Paasakivi and Fagerholm and exposing the manoeuvres of the reaction during the course of the preparation for the elections and in particular, the Paasakivi "line".

(1½ cols.) (Condensed text) "LITERARY GAZETTE" No. 14, 1950.

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(14)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE 761.00S-1025

OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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Action: EUR

Info:
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Control 10666

Rec'd March 23, 1950
7:53 a.m.

FROM: Moscow

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 917, March 22

FWS 116

SENT DEPARTMENT 917. DEPARTMENT PASS WARSAW 21.

PRAVDA March 22 carries brief item stating Legislative Sejm Poland affirmed law making people Soviets sole organs local government authority.

BARBOUR

RB:MT

NOTE: Relayed to Warsaw 3/23/50, 8:30 a.m. EP.

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PER M. JERABEK - EUR
FOI 810328

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DEC 14 1950
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COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF S[illegible]

FW0005-2084

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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OF EUR MEMBERS

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Action: EUR

Info:
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Control 10484

Rec'd March 22, 1950
6:10 p.m.

FROM: Stockholm

TO: Secretary of State 1141

NO: 383, March 22.

SENT DEPARTMENT 383, REPEATED HELSINKI 14, MOSCOW 25

Social Democratic MORGON TIDNINGEN is only Stockholm paper to print, inconspicuously, brief AP telegram from Moscow quoting PRAVDA article yesterday that new Finnish Cabinet under Kekkonen "is no less anti-Russian but still more reactionary than predecessor." Papers headline reads "expected reaction: Kekkonen is reactionary."

MATTHEWS

JRM:ELW

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PEK M. JERABEK - EUR
FOI 810328

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MAR 3 1950

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DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
TELEGRAPH BRANCH

ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 890.005-2035

INCOMING TELEGRAM

9-15

Action: EUR
Info:
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PLAIN UNCLASSIFIED

Control 1611

Rec'd April 5, 1950
6:38 a.m.

FROM: Moscow

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1043, April 5

0145

SENT DEPARTMENT 1043, DEPARTMENT PASS HELSINKI 48.

PRAVDA April 4 Helsinki Tass despatch reports celebration anniversary Finn-Soviet friendship pact in meeting organized by Democratic Union and CP. Practically whole despatch concerns Aaltonen speech inter alia criticizing reactionary character Kekkonen Government.

KIRK

AB:RT

NOTE: Relayed to Helsinki 4/5/50, 6:50 a.m. PAL.

DECLASSIFIED 6/13/78
PER M. JERABEK - EUR
FOI 810328

UNCLASSIFIED

890.5-6/4-550

APR - 6 1950

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FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SECRET: ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ 761.00S-1950 PRIORITY: AIR POUCH

EUR INDEX

TO: Department of State 660o.61/4-550

FROM: HELSINKI 288 April 5, 1950 April 11, 1950

REF: Leg Despatch 284, November 21, 1949

SUBJECT: FINN-SOVIET RELATIONS FROM MID-NOVEMBER 1949 to 31 MARCH 1950

For Dept. use only.
RECD APR 15
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INTRODUCTION

Measured by visible signs Finn-Soviet relations have since mid-November undergone no improvement and probably are now somewhat less correct than they then were. November ended on a sour note when a distinguished Soviet visitor desecrated the memory of the Finn war dead. Finn outrage was reflected in the Independence Day (6 December) speech by Prime Minister FAGERHOLM, and during the remainder of the month the Soviet press and radio sporadically and in the usual vituperative vein attacked President PAASIKIVI and the FAGERHOLM Government. The first three months of 1950 were marked by Communist efforts to prevent the re-election of President PAASIKIVI and to obtain a new cabinet less hostile to their internal objectives and more friendly to the Soviet Union than was that of FAGERHOLM. A formal Soviet charge on New Year's Eve, that the Finn Government was violating the Peace Treaty and the Friendship Pact, gave birth to unusual Finn anxiety about Soviet intentions toward Finland. The anxiety fed on several disparate matters including the persistent unwillingness of the Soviets to open the 1950 trade negotiations, probably reached a climax with the mid-March creation of the KEKKONEN government, and had abated somewhat by the end of March.

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FORMAL RELATIONS

1. General

The principal manifestations of formal relations between Finland and the Soviet Union and/or satellite states were 1) the refusal by the Soviet Union to commence trade negotiations with Finland after the arrival of the Finn Trade Delegation at Moscow about 20 November and persistent Soviet reticence on the matter during the more than four months since then; 2) the Soviet aide memoire of 31 December and note of 28 February alleging that the Finn Government was violating (Article 9 of) the Peace Treaty and the spirit of the 1948 Friendship Pact; 3) five successive interventions during February and March by a counselor of the Soviet Legation at the Finn Foreign Office in an effort to induce the Finn authorities to restore to a Soviet propaganda film some 100 meters that the Finn censors had cut therefrom; 4) the commencement at mid-February at Helsinki of Finn-Soviet negotiations to conclude the bi-annual agreement on railroad operations between the two countries; and 5) the refusal shortly after mid-March by the Soviet puppet state in eastern Germany to sign the

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1950 trade agreement with Finland unless the latter accord what would be tantamount to de jure recognition of the former.

2. Soviet Refusal to Open Trade Negotiations.

The Finn delegation that departed for Moscow shortly after mid-November to open negotiations with the Soviet Union for the 1950 trade agreement carried with it sanguine expectations of a satisfactory agreement and hopes that additional markets might be found in the Soviet Union for Finn medium and heavy engineering products. (N.B. Farseeing Finns have for some time been worried by the prospect that with the approaching completion of reparations deliveries their country would face a perplexing problem in an over-expanded metallurgical industry with products generally priced out of, of too little variety for, and generally unknown in, markets in the non-Communist world, as well as of a quality not easily marketable except in the Soviet Union or its satellite states.) They also hoped to obtain new categories of merchandise in the Soviet Union to replace grain which Finland no longer needs in such large quantities as formerly from that country. Upon arrival at Moscow the Finn delegation immediately presented its proposal to the Soviets, but it has been unable since then to bring the Soviets even to the point of opening negotiations. During none of the post-war years had Finn negotiators at Moscow ever experienced a similar refusal by the Soviets.

Conjectures to explain whey the Soviets have taken such a negative attitude towards a 1950 trade agreement with Finland remain unsupported by tangible evidence of a positive character. During the early months of the tiresome wait at Moscow Finn authorities were inclined to suppose that the Soviets were necessarily biding their time until the apparently difficult negotiations with the new Chinese government of Mao Tse TUNG had been completed. This conjecture was supported by the negative evidence of the simultaneous failure of the Soviets to carry through to completion negotiations with numerous other non-Communist states of Western and Northern Europe, even though comparison between the Soviet-Finn attempt at negotiations and negotiations between Soviet Union and the other non-Communist European states does not establish a clear parallel. With most, perhaps all, of these states, the Soviet Union at least went through the motions of commencing negotiations and exchanging at least one set of proposals and counter-proposals, and with Norway the Soviet Union reached the point of signature only indefinitely to defer that act when Norway refused to accede to a last minute Soviet demand to decuple Norwegian deliveries of aluminum.

In late February individual Finn negotiators began returning from Moscow apparently shaken from their earlier balance by nerve-racking idleness in Moscow, and reported their conviction that the Soviets were delaying the opening of the negotiations with Finland because of displeasure with the Finn Government of PAASIKIVI and

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FAGERHOLM. Within a short time many Finn authorities in Finland likewise were shaken off balance, tending to magnify the nuance of difference between the Soviet treatment of Finland and that of the other non-Communist countries into proportions which they interpreted as indicating indirect Soviet pressure on Finland to disavow the PAASIKIVI and FAGERHOLM conduct of Finn internal, but especially external, affairs. So strong did this feeling become in late February and early March that it led many responsible Finn Government officials, business men and politicians seriously to consider the advisability of taking several Communists into the Cabinet which at mid-March was formed to succeed the FAGERHOLM Cabinet. However, by the end of the month, with the British trade agreement in the bag, that feeling appeared to have abated.

3. Soviets Accuse Finns of Treaty Violation.

New Year's Eve the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister called to him the Finn Minister in Moscow and complained that Finland was breaching the Peace Treaty and violating the spirit of the Friendship Pact by ignoring its obligations under (Article 9 of) the Treaty to return to the Soviet Union "war criminals" and traitors. The Deputy Foreign Minister alleged that the Finn Government was harboring upwards of 300 such persons, and that it also was delivering false identity papers to some of them to enable them to escape detection. The Deputy Foreign Minister then delivered to the Finn Minister an aide memoire containing these charges together with a list of 56 names, purportedly the most villainous of the 300 persons (the remainder were not named) allegedly harbored by the Finnish Government.

Although the Finn Communist press had occasionally in early 1949 accused the FAGERHOLM Government of having released from arrest certain POWs whose surrender the Soviet Union had demanded, the Soviet Government had not since late 1948 or the beginning of 1949 raised the question of return to the Soviet Union of individuals falling under the provisions of Article 9 of the Peace Treaty. Indeed, because the Soviet Legation in Helsinki had ignored some 8 to 10 months earlier two successive written requests by the Finn Foreign Office that the Legation withdraw its demand for extradition of several individuals on either humanitarian grounds or because they did not in the view of the Finn Government fall under the provisions of Article 9, the Finn Foreign Office had concluded that the Soviet Legation had tacitly displayed disinterest in the matter. Consequently the delivery of the aide memoire and the oral complaint to the Finn Minister on New Year's Eve somewhat disturbed the year-end tranquility of the Finn Foreign Office and also of many other government officials, politicians, and businessmen.

Conjectures were offered in an attempt to explain the Soviet action. The character of the complaint was soon revealed, when the investigation by the Finn authorities established that two names

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covered the same identity, at least one dead person was on the list, several persons named had long ago been delivered to the Soviet Union, and the Finn authorities had officially informed the former Control Commission (during the period of the Armistice) that a large number of the individuals named had left Finland for other countries. Furthermore the Finn Government had no knowledge that any false identifying documents had been issued to any of these individuals since shortly after the date of the armistice, although in confidence they admit that local officials might have in isolated cases issued them. These facts tended to indicate that the Soviet complaint was not a seriously conceived one, and that more than likely it was merely a propaganda measure. Because the Soviet radio and press had long lambasted President PAASIKIVI and the FAGERHOLM Government as anti-Soviet, tools of western imperialistic warmongers, and reactionary, it was logical to conclude, wanting some better explanation, that the reason for the official Soviet demarche New Year's Eve was a desire to supplement the Soviet press and radio campaign by a more impressive attempt at intimidation of Finn voters scheduled to elect electors at mid-January for the presidential election in mid-February.

Since delivery of the aide memoire no evidence has been discovered providing a basis for another interpretation of this Soviet measure. On 17 January the Finn Government approved a detailed and reasoned reply to the Soviet aide memoire, and it was delivered to the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister in Moscow on 21 January. Not until 28 February did the Soviet Government return to the matter, and then it presented a note to the Finn Minister in Moscow again accusing the Finnish Government of providing false identification papers to many of the persons whose extradition the Soviet Government desired under Article 9 of the Peace Treaty, and of otherwise providing protection to these individuals, but not making any new charges. The Soviet note did not rebut the Finn arguments in the Finnish note of 17 January, and the Finn Foreign Office, having decided that the Soviet note did not require an answer, made none. Whether the new Finn Government, which came to power on 17 March is of a like mind, remains to be seen.

The Finn Government has not yet received any reply to its note delivered to the Soviets on 28 February as a supplement to its note of 17 January. In the supplementary note the Finn Government declared that an investigation had shown that of the four persons very recently apprehended as wanted by the Soviets, three were found to have become naturalized Finns and the other, a woman, had some time ago married a Finn and had become a mother. The Finn Government therefore could not find an obligation to return the three men and asked that for humanitarian reasons the Soviets withdraw their request for extradition of the woman.

With reference to the anxiety created among Finns following the receipt of the Soviet aide memoire on New Year's Eve, it should be recorded that on 30 December press services in Helsinki quoted the Chief of the Political Division of the Foreign Office about

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reports from New York of supposed massing of Soviet troops on the Finn frontier. The question therefore arises whether Soviet agents planted these stories somewhere, hoping to heighten the effect on the Finns of the aide memoire which was delivered 31 December.

4. Soviet Official Protests Cut in Soviet Film by Finn Censors

In late January or early February a counselor of the Soviet Legation called on the Secretary General of the Foreign Office and vehemently protested, in the name of the "Legation only", the excision of approximately 100 meters from a Soviet propaganda film contrasting the purported efforts for peace by Soviet leaders and the alleged efforts for war by leading western "warmongers". The Secretary General explained to the counselor that the importer of the film had not asked for a review of the decision by the Censorship Board, and that before any other steps might be considered it would be proper for the importer to request such a review. The counselor was not satisfied with this reply and some days later again demanded the restoration of the 100 meters. The Secretary General then declared that there was no way the Finn authorities could deviate from the prescribed course of action for such cases but that they would suggest to the importer that he request such a review. Despite the fact that the review was made and that all but about 10 meters, which depicted the President of the United States in person as a warmonger, were restored to the film by the Review Board, the Soviet counselor made three more visits to the Secretary General, each time insisting on the restoration of all parts cut from the film. To this reiterated insistence the Secretary General finally replied that Finn laws and regulations made it impossible for the Foreign Office to do anything further about the matter, but that perhaps the importer could find some legal means to bring about another review. The Secretary General believes that because the Counselor made clear that he was intervening not on behalf of his Government but only on behalf of his Legation, the Counselor must have been led to make his numerous interventions by a desire to acquire a personal laurel.

5. Finn-Soviet Railroad Negotiations

At mid-February five Soviet railroad officials came to Finland to negotiate with Finn delegates a new agreement for operation of international railroad traffic between Finland and the Soviet Union. This negotiation has thus far taken place without incident but with some protraction. When completed the agreement will prescribe operating procedures for the coming two years.

6. Reparations Deliveries

The first six months of the 18-month sixth reparation period ended 31 December 1949 with all deliveries by Finland on time and ex... 2,250,000 dollars worth of early deliveries not due until later periods.

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7. Finn Honors to STALIN on Birthday

On the occasion of STALIN's 70th birthday the Finn Government despatched to Moscow a painting of a well-known Russian painter (AIVASORSKI), which the Finn Minister of Foreign Commerce, TAKKI, then sojourning at Moscow, together with the resident Finn Minister, presented to STALIN on behalf of the Finn Government and Diet. It appears that the gift had an intrinsic value which the Finn Government no doubt calculated would be properly esteemed by STALIN and other Soviet authorities who might obtain knowledge of its bestowal.

Hertta KUUSINEN and Ville PESSI, two of the foremost figures in the Communist Party in Finland, went to Moscow for the birthday, and, along with numerous high officials from the satellite states, attended various ceremonies in Moscow connected with the birthday. They returned to Finland shortly after the New Year. It will be noted that their stay in Moscow coincided with the period during which probably was drafted the Soviet aide memoire delivered to the Finn Minister at Moscow on New Year's Eve. Likewise it is noteworthy that the Soviet Minister in Helsinki, General SAVCHENKOV, was in Moscow during that period. However, the latter had gone to Moscow already in late November and his presence there probably had, therefore, no more than a casual connection with the aide memoire.

Numerous Finn high authorities, including the President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Education Minister, Speaker of the Diet, and the Commander in Chief of the Finn Defense Forces, attended a festival by the Finland-Soviet Union Society in honor of the birthday. The Commanding General, the Chief of Staff and the Quartermaster General called at the Soviet Legation on behalf of the Armed Forces, and the President and Prime Minister sent telegrams of felicitations to STALIN.

8. Finn Recognition of Mao Tse Tung

During January the Finn Government recognized the Communist regime led by Mao Tse Tung as the government of China.

9. Trade Agreement with Soviet Zone State of Germany

Last autumn when the Soviet occupation authorities replaced the German Administration in the Soviet Zone by a puppet German Government the Finn Government had nearly completed its routine negotiations with the German Administration for the 1950 trade agreement. Although accord was reached and the agreement initialled by the unaccredited Finn representative in the Soviet Sector of Berlin, the Finn Government long refrained from signing the agreement with the new puppet state after the Soviet Zone moved [illegible]

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had proclaimed that the initialling of the agreement had constituted Finn recognition of the new Soviet Zone state. However, in late February, after Finland had incurred a substantial debt under the Agreement, the Finn Government proceeded to authorize its Berlin representative to sign the Agreement. By this act the Finn Government had no intention to accord the Soviet Zone state de facto recognition although it recognized that that state would so interpret the act. At mid-March the Soviet Zone state informed the Finn representative that before signing the Agreement it desired to exchange diplomatic missions with Finland. At the end of March the Finn Foreign Office instructed its Berlin representative to endeavor to obtain the signed Agreement without any additional obligations for Finland. At month's end the Finn Foreign Office was not considering granting de jure recognition to the puppet state.

10. Finn-Bulgarian Trade Agreement

Although the Finn delegation at Moscow waited in vain for the opening of negotiations with the Soviet Union for the 1950 trade agreement, it did succeed in March in concluding a trade agreement for 1950 with the Bulgarian trade delegation at Moscow.

INFORMAL RELATIONS

1. General

Informal relations, those expressed by the Soviet radio and press, by the visits to Finland of the Soviet Union of artists and sport representatives, by delegations of "Peace Partisans", and by the efforts of the Finn Communist Party, varied little, with one exception, from what has been the normal pattern during at least the past year or so. The exception was the visit to Finland in late November of several of the highest ranking present VOKS dignitaries and the attack made by a Soviet representative of VOKS against the Finn use of "Pro Patria" on the headstones of Finn war dead. This desecration outraged Finns. Much of the unofficial effort was directed to an unsuccessful attempt to defeat President PAASIKIVI as candidate for reelection in the regular elections of mid-January and re-election by electors at mid-February, and to obtain the inclusion of Communists in the new government.

2. Month of Friendship and Aftermath

Following the visit to Helsinki in October of KUZNETSOV, the Chief of the Soviet Trade Union Organization, the Finland-Soviet Union Society inaugurated at the beginning of November its so-called "Month of Finn-Soviet Friendship". The Soviets started a troupe of artists of very good quality on a tour of Finland, and about the 20th of the month they sent to Finland an important delegation from VOKS, including the present president (DENISOV), vice president (JAKOLEV), the Scandinavian Division chief, a [illegible]

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president (KEMENOV), and a feature writer for PRAVDA (ZASLOVSKI). For the Soviets the month progressed with surface indications of sympathetic acceptance by the Finn population of the Soviet effort until the 26th of November when KEMENOV profaned in Finn eyes the Finn war dead by a blundering public deprecation of the "Pro Patria" epitaph engraved on their tombstones. The blunder was followed within a day or so by another, but somewhat less important one by ZASLOVSKI, who, at a public gathering and in the presence of President PAASIKIVI, condemned outright the Finn pardoning of "war criminals". As is well known in Finland (but perhaps unknown to ZASLOVSKI), the Finn constitution confers the power of pardoning upon the President. These two incidents effectively effaced whatever profitable work the Soviets perhaps had succeeded in accomplishing during the so-called Month of Friendship.

The Soviet press and radio waited about 10 days before making any reference to the KEMENOV and ZASLOVSKI statements, and then referred to them only by way of indirection and as part of the polemic against reactionary Finnish circles for their alleged support of anti-Soviet chauvinism. An article at mid-December by ZASLOVSKI himself declared that the peak of Finn insolence had been the publication in the HELSINGIN SANOMAT of General Bedell SMITH's "slanderous anti-Soviet articles" while official Finn circles were pretending friendship to the visiting VOKS delegation. The Soviet press and radio also bitterly criticized Prime Minister FAGERHOLM for his passing commemoration of the Finn war dead in his Independence Day (6 December) speech.

3. Chancellor of Justice Refutes Communist Charges of Treaty Violation

To answer Communist allegations that the Finn Government was violating the Peace Treaty, especially its Articles 6, 7, 8 and 9, President PAASIKIVI in the late spring of 1949 had ordered the Chancellor of Justice to make a study of the matter and submit to him a report. Early last December the Chancellor presented his report which refuted all Communist charges.

Article 6. The report pointed out that at the Paris Peace Conference the Finn delegation including its SKDL members had unanimously declared that the principles regarding basic freedoms expressed in Article 6 had already been embodied in the Finn constitution. The report also stated that, despite such a guarantee, the state cannot allow basic freedoms to mean anarchy (the violation of the equal rights of others); that consequently Finland, as well as other countries, has regulations for the maintenance of public order and security; and that should a specific charge be made of violation of a basic right or freedom the justice of the charge would be determined.

Article 7. Charges had been made of discrimination, in violation of this Article, by a refusal to grant to former Finns, who

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had become naturalized Russians, permission either to sojourn in Finland for periods longer than six months at a time, or to become Finns again through naturalization. The report declared that the Finn authorities merely applied to all Soviet citizens without distinction the same restriction on sojourns that the Soviet authorities applied to foreigners in the Soviet Union, and that if the former Finn citizens met all legal requirements they could become naturalized Finns, in which procedure they would enjoy preference over other Soviet applicants because formerly they had been Finn citizens.

Article 8. The report declares that acting under a governmental decree of 23 September 1944 the Finn Government had dissolved a number of organizations proscribed by this Article; moreover, that merely because one or more former members of such dissolved organizations might join other organizations the latter did not thereby acquire an illegal character; that only if the latter attempted to continue an illegal activity of a dissolved organization could it also be dissolved; under the same Article Finland was obliged to prevent organizations from more or less continuously and deliberately carrying on propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union or any other nation; that among the news items cited specifically as hostile to the Soviet Union none had been found that originated in Finland; that there had been ill-considered languages in some articles about the Soviet Union that had led the Finn authorities in four cases to file suits against the editors; but that on the basis of the articles cited by the Communists the claims of anti-Soviet propaganda were misleading and exaggerated, especially if those articles be considered beside the extreme and deliberate propaganda in the SNDL press about other United Nations to which Article 8 grants protection equal to that granted the Soviet Union.

Article 9. Regarding allegations that Finland had violated this Article by releasing from prison certain Soviet POWs whose surrender the Soviet Union had demanded, the report declares that the Finn authorities had released only one POW, a woman who had become a Finn citizen through marriage and whose exemption from surrender the Finn Government had requested on humanitarian grounds; that the Soviet Union had requested the surrender of 11 persons, who had been under arrest but whose names did not appear on the lists of POWs; that although they are Soviet citizens, the Finn authorities have neither received details proving them guilty of crimes specified by Article 9 of the Peace Treaty, nor established such guilt through their own investigations; and that consequently Finn action with respect to these persons must be considered to have been strictly in accord with Article 9.

4. Soviet and Finn Communist Propaganda Attack Paasikivi "Myth"

On 15 January the Soviet radio broadcast in the Finn language an article by MAXIMOV in the LITERARY GAZETTE, describing a half-

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century of President PAASIKIVI's life as an illustration of the "myth" that he is liberal in thought and well-disposed toward the Soviet Union. It proclaimed him a reactionary, a friend of Fascist Germany, a proponent of a monarchy for Finland with a princely German as chief of state, and a leader of the Finn Coalition Party's anti-worker policies of the 1920's. During the remainder of January and February the Soviet press and radio, insofar as they devoted space and time to the matter, pursued this line of "dissipation" of the PAASIKIVI myth. The Finn Communist press took the same line, which had been initiated by the authoritative KOMMUNISTI of the Finn Communist Party as early as last August. In addition to linking President PAASIKIVI and his Prime Minister, FAGERHOLM, to western political leadership, the Communist line after 22 January proclaimed that, to be able to go forward with the negotiation of the trade agreement with the Soviet Union, it would be necessary to oust both PAASIKIVI and FAGERHOLM. Apparently before 22 January, the Soviets had not been sure enough that their refusal to start negotiations would be long enough protracted to give permission to Finn Communists to use such a line. Certainly it was not used before the mid-January elections, when the Communists referred only sporadically and incidentally to the delay at Moscow.

5. Finn Newspaper Union Withdraws from IOJ.

In January the Finn Newspaper Union announced that it had as of 31 December 1949, withdrawn from the IOJ with headquarters at Prague, giving as the reason for its act its conviction that IOJ had become merely an arena for the battles between east and west.

6. Meeting of Communist Party Council.

Between 11 and 13 March the Finn Communist Party Council held its sixth regular meeting at Helsinki. The two principal speeches expounded the Cominform themes on unification of the labor movement and peace. In his speech Party Secretary PEKKI accused the reactionary bourgeoisie and the Social Democrats of preparation to nullify the Peace Treaty, alleging that FAGERHOLM's rightist Social Democrat Cabinet had taken relatively long steps back toward the pre-war policy which was inconsonant with the "democratic" policy set forth in the Armistice Agreement and the Peace Treaty. He declared that the Soviet note on New Year's Eve had proved flagrant violation of Article 9; that the Finn constitution only stipulated, but did not guarantee, the right of action for Finn Communists and other anti-Fascists who had been persecuted, arrested and most cruelly tortured; and that the Communists waged a consistent struggle for fulfillment of the political articles of the Agreement and Treaty because they contain the necessary change of policy required, not only by external conditions, but by the needs of the whole Finn people. PEKKI reiterated that the principal task of the Communist Party is to achieve unity in the labor movement, which "can be created by an every/day struggle to improve the workers' economic position", which struggle would reveal the

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rightist Social Democrat traitors as capitalist agents in the labor movement.

In his speech to the meeting of the Council, Party President AALTONEN declared that one of the most preferred camouflages of the anti-Soviet foreign policy and propaganda in Finland is the slogan about the "special mission of the Finn people in history"; that those who spread the slogan simultaneously accuse the Communists of "unpatriotism", of denial of national interests and of an "un-Finn" policy; that this "disgusting slander and falsification" is accepted by a part of the Finn populace especially by the rural element and petty bourgeoisie; that the Communists had been unable to "explain" sufficiently their attitude towards either the Fatherland, national freedom or collaboration of the peoples (in contrast to bourgeois nationalism and the world citizenship ideas spread by American idealists); that even all Communists had not fully understood their attitude; and that the most important Communist task is the unmasking of warmongers who try to trick the Finn people by a powerful propaganda campaign in support of the anti-Soviet plans of the western imperialists and the domestic war politicians.

At the conclusion of its meeting the Council issued the following resolution: 1) that the rightist Social Democrats had made it impossible for Finland to join the camp of progressive democracy which had gathered strength lost by the camp of reaction; 2) that the FAGERHOLM Cabinet conducted a cold war against the Soviet Union; 3) that the Finn reaction assists in fomenting a third world-war, thereby endangering Finn peace and independence; 4) that one of the most pressing tasks of the party is to preserve peace; 5) that unity of all democratic elements must be achieved; and 6) that the Party membership should be increased by 20%, especially by intellectuals and small farmers.

7. Meeting of Partisans of Peace.

On 20 March the so-called Partisans of Peace held a rally at Helsinki at which the honor guests were the Italian Senator SERENI, the French Abbot BOULIER, the British citizen Mrs. Franzeska CROWTHER, and the Polish Author KRUCZKOWSKI, all of whom had just arrived from the meeting at Stockholm of the World Committee of the Partisans and had been welcomed at the Helsinki airport by the chiefs of the satellite missions here. The honor guests called on Prime Minister KEKKONEN and presented to him for transmittal to the Diet a copy of the declaration adopted by the Stockholm gathering. KEKKONEN suavely told the group that his Government had included in its program a plank calling for safeguarding of peace and that he consequently had a sympathetic attitude towards the declaration.

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COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS

Careful consideration of the known events of, and intelligence received during, the period 15 November 1949 and 31 March 1950 leads one to wonder whether the Soviet Government perhaps decided in December upon a slight relaxation of its earlier policy of formal restraint towards Finland. During the period there were isolated signs of possible formal pressure on Finland to direct it into paths which it would not willingly choose to enter. These signs were: 1) the Soviet allegation, unprecedented in that written, of willful infraction by Finland of the Peace Treaty and the spirit of the Friendship Pact, 2) the very recent attempt by the new puppet state in the Soviet Zone of Germany to extract de jure recognition from Finland, and, possibly, 3) the persistent refusal by the Soviets to open negotiations for a trade agreement for 1950.

In both their formal and informal relations the Soviets appear consistently to have sought to further the Cominform-inspired campaign by Finn Communists to achieve two principal objectives, viz, peace (the paralysis of opposition to Soviet aims and moves) and unification of the labor movement (naturally under Communist leadership). The Soviet press and radio sustained the Finn Communists in their vain attempt to promote the cause of "peace" by defeating at the January-February elections President PAASIKIVI, whom they characterized as a reactionary tool of the trans-Atlantic imperialist instigators of a third world-war, and by obtaining a post-election cabinet less inflexible before Communist pressure than had been that of FAGERHOLM. In a manner which did not provide grounds to the Finn Government to prefer counter-charges of violation of the Friendship Pact by intervention in Finn internal affairs, the Soviet Foreign Office lent itself to the Communist attempt by delivering on New Year's Eve and again on 20 February the allegation that Finland had willfully violated and was violating (Article 9 of) the Peace Treaty and the spirit of the Friendship Pact. The allegation was the first written Soviet charge of treaty violation by Finland since the Armistice. The capricious character of both Soviet documents was such as to give a strong indication that their real purpose was not the purported one but was to intimidate the Finns who were about to select their new president and cabinet.

For one state formally to charge another with deliberate violation of a treaty normally is a grave matter. Since the Armistice the Soviet Union had only once before made such a charge, but then in a less formal manner. In late summer 1948, shortly after the minority FAGERHOLM-led Social Democrat Cabinet had become the Government of Finland, the Soviet Legation at Helsinki orally alleged to the Finn Foreign Office that Finland was violating the Peace Treaty by tolerating the persistence (or recrudescence) of "fascist" shooting clubs. After an official Finn investigation had discovered that the Soviet accusation was baseless the Foreign Office ignored the matter and it became buried by the sands of time, except probably in the records of the Soviet authorities charged with maintaining a case against Finland. That matter did not serve as an introduction to early further Soviet action, although it preceded by a short time and perhaps merely by chance both the widespread Finn

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Communist agitation among workers and in the trade unions for a general wage increase and the Communist-inspired disorders at the Arabia plant in Helsinki. It would be safer not to dismiss at once from mind the thought that the Soviet aide memoire of 31 December 1949 and note of 28 February 1950 might have a formal sequence, in contradistinction to the course of events in late 1948. It is not impossible that the attack on Finland made in these documents was merely the opening move on the formal plane in a Soviet war of nerves in support of the Finn Communists not only during the elections and choice of a new government but also during the spring link in their campaign to unify the labor movement under Communist control.

The New Year's Eve indictment of Finland for treaty violation is also remarkable because in fact it also inculpated the PEKKALA Government. During several years that Government had been responsible for the apprehension and delivery to the Soviet Union of "war criminals" and traitors who fell under Articles 10 and 13 of the Armistice Agreement and Article 9 of the Peace Treaty. Despite undoubted ardent efforts during that time, the then Communist-led State Police was able to apprehend only a portion of the persons it sought; and it had long since reached the point of diminishing returns when the FAGERHOLM Government took office and purged it of its Communist leaders and otherwise reorganized it. Thereafter, it is true, the Police apprehended many fewer of those persons, and the FAGERHOLM Government did not extradite all of them. But, as many of those sought had much earlier fled abroad (their departure having been duly reported by the PEKKALA Government to the Control Commission), the FAGERHOLM Government and its reorganized Police, with the best will in the world, could not have done much better than they did.

The formal Soviet war of nerves, which it seems reasonable to postulate, had partial success. Indeed, PAASIKIVI was re-elected despite it, but many Finns had become more nervous than probably at any time since the presentation two years earlier of the Soviet request for a pact of mutual assistance and friendship. Even President PAASIKIVI did not escape the nervousness, which was heightened by several matters. In the first place, responsible Finns could not persuade themselves that the Soviets did not intend to follow up their New Year's Eve step in favor of the Finn Communists by another and more disquieting one. In the second place, although a Finn delegation had gone to Moscow at mid-November to negotiate a trade agreement for 1950, the Soviets had since then persistently professed complete ignorance as to when they might be expected to be ready to open negotiations. The fact that the Finn Minister of Foreign Trade and his first deputy returned to Helsinki from Moscow in late February and March with pessimistic reports about Soviet intentions unquestionably intensified the nervousness. Despite the fact that no other non-Communist country of western or northern Europe was known to have succeeded in completing negotiation of a 1950 trade agreement with the Soviet Union during the period following mid-November, although many had tried to do so, numerous important Finns had come to believe that the Soviets were, through failure

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to open negotiations with Finland, singling out the Government of that country as an object of their displeasure. In the third place, during the January elections the Communists had held their ground, even gaining somewhat in Lapland, whereas the Social Democrats had lost ground, it is true largely through abstentions from voting but also probably in slight measure through voting by Social Democrat followers for Communist electors.

These factors tended to immerse the politically sensitive part of the Finn populace in a sort of psychosis, the only egress from which appeared to them to be the adoption of a less intransigent attitude towards the Soviet Union than that which the FAGERHOLM Government had manifested. Consequently some responsible business, governmental and political leaders as well as President PAASIKIVI gave serious consideration to the inclusion of Communists in the new government. The fact that eventually Communists were not included must be attributed more to the unwillingness of the greater part of the Social Democrats to take such a risk than to any other cause. As it was, Prime Minister KEKKONEN consciously selected for his fellow cabinet members many men known in the Soviet Union for their not unfriendly disposition toward that country. From the change in government numerous Finns hope to obtain at least a trade agreement with the Soviet Union and respite from, if not surcease of, the Soviet press and radio vilification of the Finn Government. KEKKONEN and his disciples are prepared to give to Moscow all benefit of doubt in attempting to carry on amicable relations with the Soviet Union within the scope of the Friendship Pact, i.e., on a basis of equality. However, the initial and acid reception by Moscow of the new Government, which has appeared in the LITERARY GAZETTE, must have been something less than encouraging, if not disillusioning, to such hopes. It tends to lend substance to the feeling that Moscow will hardly be prepared to cease to complain about Finland until the Communists are once again in the government, and that with a bourgeois government in office it considers that there are fewer impediments enroute to that goal than with a Social Democrat government holding the reins.

Besides the Soviet aide memoire of 31 December and note of 28 February alleging treaty infractions and violation of the spirit of the Friendship Pact, an additional sign of pressure on the Finn Government has been the request by the puppet German Government of the Soviet Zone of Germany for an exchange of diplomatic missions before the latter Government will sign the 1950 Trade Agreement. It is too early to discern whether this pressure is an isolated phenomenon, or part of a concerted campaign by the Soviet Union and its satellites to force Finland into concessions violating its principles and ultimately endangering its independence. Intelligence has been received indicating that high international Communist thinking has concluded that an augmentation of pressure against Finland can eventually break the will of that country to resist and bring it into the camp of the popular democracies. However, a sign pointing in the opposite direction, or at least to an as yet loosely knit organization of such pressure, is the successful conclusion at Moscow in March of the Finn-Bulgar Trade Agreement of 1950.

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SECRET FRD 005-1[illegible] 15 Helsinki 288

Now that Finland has selected its new president and government, the Finn Communists and the press and radio organs of their Moscow masters can be expected to concentrate their attention and vigor on serious struggle to break the Social Democrat control of the trade union movement. It seems unlikely that many holds will be barred in this struggle, the prospects of which seriously worry the Social Democrat leadership, especially as it believes that not enough of the bourgeois leaders may be equally perceptive of the necessity that the Social Democrats triumph. Some Social Democrat leaders feel that all too many of the bourgeoisie tend to regard the Social Democrats with only a slightly less inimical eye than they do the Communists.

It remains to be seen whether or not the Soviet Union and possibly its satellite states will follow up the formal indirect pressure already brought to bear on Finland by similar pressure to assist the Communists to capture stronger positions in the labor movement this spring. During the Communist-led rolling strike campaign last August and September which encountered the resolute opposition of the Social Democrat Government, the Soviet Union made no formal attempt to assist. But at the end of 1949 something, perhaps increased confidence arising from the denouement in China, moved that Government to attempt formally but indirectly to influence the course of the elections and the formation of a new government in Finland. Moreover, in late January the Soviets apparently authorized the Finn Communists to exploit for the same purpose Soviet unwillingness (for whatever reason inspired it) to open trade negotiations. In the main, however, Soviet policy towards Finland seems to continue to be, in the absence of a military threat to the northwest frontier of the Soviet Union, one of restraint and expectancy that time, the "crisis of capitalism" and the relentless efforts of the Finn Communists will suffice to take Finland from the camp of western democracy into that of the people's democracies. But it ought not to excite wonder should the Soviet Union, perhaps together with its satellites, in the near future test the fiber of the new bourgeois government of Finland by another application of indirect pressure to determine whether it could thereby hasten the course of events that it expects.

John M. Cabot
Minister

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DIVISION OF
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1005-1940

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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FROM: Moscow

Control 3040
Rec'd April 7, 195
5:59 p.m.

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1071, April 7

027

SENT DEPARTMENT 1071 DEPARTMENT PASS HELSINKI 51

LITERARY GAZETTE April 5 prints one column Malenkov article, "Service Records of Finnish Ministers". Asserting Finnish Cabinet "represents interests big capital", accuses Prime Minister Kekkonen of backtrack ag on statements on improvement Finn-Soviet relations mad as President Diet. Re Hellias, says "at time war this fighter in preachers frock coat appealed not to spare blood to defeat Russian chauvinists". Calls Tuomioja "foremost banker Finland" who negotiated "enslaving" loans with US. Says "Ministry War given to Finnish Fascist Titu", calls Swedish Peoples Party "closely allied with Anglo-American capital ... helped place Finland in war on German side". "Bountifulness of men of 1949 in government ... shows character of polic Finnish reaction".

KIRK

JRM:GC

Relayed to Helsinki 6 p.m. 4/7/50 MB.

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APR 12 1950

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FROM: Stockholm

Control 6845
Rec'd April 18, 1950
2:31 p.m.

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 483, April 14

SENT DEPARTMENT 483, REPEATED MOSCOW 34, HELSINKI 15, PARIS 104, LONDON 72, POUCHED OSLO AND COPENHAGEN.

Liberal EXPRESSEN yesterday afternoon featured report from its Helsinki correspondent headed "Communist Helsinki Paper Wishes Provoke Soviet Intervention" quoting VAPAA SANA article suggesting that Baltic incident has aggravated war risk to a point where Article 2 of Soviet-Finnish Mutual Assistance Pact of 1948 would be invoked, implying joint consultations looking toward common defense against "aggression". Correspondent says "responsible political quarters" in Helsinki are astonished by VAPAA SANA commentary and "find it difficult to escape suspicion that intention is to seek provoke Russian interest in implementing pact". Correspondent adds that Article 2 entails greatest risks since under it, pact may be implemented as soon as either party "establishes" that "war threat prevails".

VAPAA SANA article not mentioned to today's Stockholm press, but Communist NY DAG makes lead story of allegation that "American maneuver" in Baltic is now being concentrated in Finnish Gulf - "inlet to Leningrad.

MATTHEWS

JB:GMC

NOTE: Message delayed in transmission.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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FROM: Helsinki

Control 5387
Rec'd April 24, 1950
6:15 p.m.

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 193, April 24

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Meeting to which all Finnish press invited and which attended by more than hundred newsmen Prime Minister there stated development Finn-Soviet relations since signing defense pact two years ago not satisfactory. VAPAA SANA reports that Prime Minister stated incumbency Fagerholm Cabinet signified worsened Finland-Soviet Union relations. He promised that new Cabinet will do utmost to achieve good relations with Soviet Union.

HUFVUDSTABLADET quotes Prime Minister as saying at same time relations with other countries should also be cherished especially where markets for Finn exports concerned whereas VAPAA SANA quotes Prime Minister as saying maintenance good relations with West is necessary for preservation of trade relations.

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Foreign Minister Gartz expressed concern for anti-Soviet news items in press which sharpened by headlines and also warned (clearly referring to Communist press) against irresponsible writing about other countries. He appealed to press to observe a balance in its reporting and carefully choose its words when writing on foreign political matters. VAPAA SANA editor Palmgren thereupon asked Gartz if Cabinet was satisfied with on-the-one-hand-on-the-other-hand policy by which Soviet Union, the bastion of peace and ally of Finland, is placed in same position as warmongering countries with which Finland is not allied. In reply Gartz referred to books on theory of neutrality. Prime Minister however hastened to aid of Foreign Minister

remarking that

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-2-#123, April [illegible], from Helsinki

remarking that latter had already placed special emphasis on attitude of press to Soviet Union.

SOVINFORM representative asked if Cabinet did not agree that Finn press wrote too little about Soviet Union. Prime Minister replied government cannot influence press in this regard. Agraruab MAAKANSA editor said more Soviet material would be printed if SOVINFORM would provide suitable copy.

Asked about Cabinet's attitude toward GATT agreement, Prime Minister merely referred to Czechoslovakia's adherence and said that matter had been amply discussed in Diet. With regard domestic matters, probably most significant statement of Prime Minister was that Cabiret intended to maintain December 1949 price and wage level.

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FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

P790005-1917

SECURITY: SECRET UNCLASSIFIED

PRIORITY
OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MESSAGE ORAIR POUCH

TO: Department of State

FROM: HELSINKI 343 April 21, 1950

1950 MAY 2 AM 11:56

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EUR INDEX
C152

REF:

SUBJECT: CENTRAL EUROPEAN QUESTIONS AND THE SITUATION EXISTING BETWEEN FINLAND AND RUSSIA

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At the risk of belaboring the trite and the obvious, I venture to suggest that the Department may wish to ponder the implications on Central European questions of the present situation existing between Finland and Russia.

At Yalta the basis on which it was agreed that Central European governments should be reestablished was essentially one of free and unfettered elections. Such elections were in fact held only in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and even in those two countries the effects were wiped out by subsequent Communist coups. Our diplomacy, which both focuses and expresses our national feeling, has continued to demand that the nations of Central Europe which are now Russian satellites be permitted to form their own governments. Given our democratic traditions, such an attitude appears axiomatic to us, and there can be no question that the American public sincerely believes that it is a prerequisite to the establishment of justice and peace in the world.

It must not be overlooked, however, that throughout our wartime collaboration with Soviet Russia we steadily insisted that the governments of Soviet Russia's neighbors must not be hostile to Russia. Such an attitude appeared only logical, since Russia had been so often invaded over its western, northwestern and southwestern frontiers. Clearly Russia could feel no security so long as her neighbors along these frontiers were not friendly. The frightful war devastation in Russia strengthened Russia's feelings in this regard.

So far as I am aware, we cannot now see what the Russians really intended when they signed the Yalta Agreements. It may be, as is often claimed, that they never had the slightest intention of living up to them, and that these agreements were signed merely as a means of hoodwinking the Western Allies until Russia could confront them with a series of faits accompli. It is also possible that the Russians at Yalta sincerely misgauged the situation and thought that once the proletarian masses of Eastern Europe were "liberated" by the Soviet Armies they would never again submit to the yoke of the classes which had been "exploiting" them. Whatever the truth may be, it cannot have been very long - certainly not later than the Hungarian

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F79005-1918

elections of 1945 - that the Russians knew that all of their western neighbors continued to harbor strong anti-Russian sentiments, despite their "liberation."

I am not familiar with American thinking on this point during the period of policy formation which preceded Yalta. I find it exceedingly difficult, however, to see how we could after careful consideration have come to the conclusion that governments friendly to Russia were likely to arise as a result of free and unfettered elections in any countries which border on Russia. The Russians doubtless interpret our attitude as evidence of American perfidy. My own guess is that our course was actually based on self delusion and wishful thinking.

I feel that these thoughts have definite pertinence with regard to Finland's position today and that that position has definite pertinence with regard to the situation in Central Europe. Alone among Russia's Western neighbors, Finland was not overrun by Russian troops at the end of the war and has therefore been able to maintain a sturdy if precarious independence. Every Finnish government and practically every utterance from responsible sources since the war has emphasized good relations with Russia as the cornerstone of Finnish foreign policy. Considering Finland's defenseless and exposed position, such a policy is the only possible one under the present circumstances. Nevertheless, it would be absurd to claim that it represents the whole story and that the Finnish nation now desires only to live at peace with the Soviet Union. That the Finns want peace is undeniable, but they want it because they know what their fate would be if it were broken. The vast majority of the Finns hate the Russians, and many of them would like a chance to go to war to recover Karelia if they thought they had a chance of success. Many of the men who emphasize the need for good relations with Russia in fact detest Russia for very obvious reasons. The Russians are of course aware of this.

I feel that Finland's experience is a pretty clear illustration of what would happen if free and unfettered elections were ever to be held in any of the Russian satellite nations. We may agree with the Russians that the governments of those countries should be friendly to the Soviet Union; but the hard fact is that any government in those countries which really represents the people's will is not going to be friendly to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union knows this and is not going to abandon the positions it secured as a result of the war. It is going to hope that by pressure and indoctrination it can change the minds of the people of Central Europe. It has every reason to suppose that sweet reasonableness would not only fail but might also result in another invasion of Russia.

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I realize that there is no indication whatsoever that the Soviets are trying to be reasonable or have tried to be reasonable at any time since the end of the war. I think it important, however, for us to decide what we do want - whether we are to work for some settlement which the Russians if they were reasonable (or impelled to become so) might accept or whether we are to seek to promote freedom throughout the world. I appreciate that the strategy we would follow today would be substantially the same whichever objective we sought ultimately to attain. Perhaps it is not essential at the moment even to define our objective, but I am inclined to think that it is desirable. My point is that we should decide whether we are fighting the cold war for limited or unlimited objectives. We have every reason to suppose that the Russians are fighting the cold war for unlimited objectives, on the basis of communist dogma. If we do the same to uphold freedom, it is probable that many people will place the blame equally on us, even though we seek to liberate others from the communist tyranny; if on the other hand, our objectives are limited, we should have them clearly defined in our own minds and have them in mind in every tactical move we make. I am impelled to make these comments after reading the stimulating discussion in the Bureau of European Affairs Weekly Review for April 12, I realize that I may have only a superficial understanding of the Department's thinking.

To return to my major train of thought, it seems to me inescapable that Soviet pressure against Finland must continue. The Soviets almost undoubtedly think they will get nowhere with sweet reasonableness and they are almost certainly right in so thinking. From the Russians' viewpoint, the Finns are going to behave themselves only so long as they have a very healthy fear of the consequences if they do not. Any marked relaxation of pressure would almost undoubtedly result in an accentuated drift of Finland toward the Western camp. The Russians must therefore continue to press against any Finnish government which is not completely subservient to its will. If such a subservient government were ever to come into being, the pressure would, of course, then merely be transferred to any possible dissident elements in it and to the Finnish people.

I feel that we should perhaps derive a grain of comfort from the above train of thought. If a continual pressure is inevitable, then there is no special reason to be surprised or alarmed at reiterated manifestations of it. We cannot, of course, rule out the possibility that some time the Russians will decide that Finland is a latent menace to their security and must be wiped out, but we must also appreciate the very real political obstacles which the Kremlin undoubtedly faces with regard to any aggression against Finland. The Kremlin's course

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will be determined by the balance it strikes between the advantages of getting rid of a free Finland on its borders and the political and other objections it foresees to such a course.

The above analysis confirms, I believe the wisdom of the policy which we are pursuing today. The real danger in the situation as I see it is that the Russians will either imagine that we have secured military or political positions in this country, which of course we have not, or that we are likely to secure such positions and must be forestalled. In the inscrutable and conspiratorial atmosphere which surrounds Kremlin policy making, such dangers cannot be lightly brushed aside. At the same time, we must not nurture such thoughts by indiscretions on our part. Even if we are fighting the cold war for unlimited objectives, we must not drag Finland into it. I am not afraid that either the Finnish or American policy makers will be guilty of such indiscretions but I am somewhat concerned lest petty officials or private citizens may be guilty of them. That as I see it is the most important danger we must guard against at the present time, and, negative though it may be, it is possibly the greatest single contribution we can make to the continuance of Finnish freedom.

John M. Cabot

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FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

P750005-1921

SECRET: CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED PRIORITY: SURFACE POUCH

TO: Department of State

660c.61/4-2550

FROM: HELSINKI 356, April 25, 1950

REF:

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH NEW FINNISH MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE

EUR INDEX
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There is being enclosed a memorandum of conversation between Minister of Agriculture T. N. Vilhula and Legation Attache J. Raymond Ylitalo, which occurred on April 22, 1950. It is evident from Minister Vilhula's remarks that it is the calculated policy of the new Kekkonen Government to be considerate of the Soviet Union and its agents in Finland, the Finnish Communist Party, to the extent that such consideration does not appear to that Government to jeopardize Finnish independence.

Warren H. Chase
Counselor of Legation

Enclosure: a/a

Memorandum of Conversation with Finnish Minister of Agriculture

Copy to NEA/NOE

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F790005-1922

Memorandum of Conversation between Minister of Agriculture T. E. Vilhula and Legation Attache J. R. Ylitalo, April 22, 1950

Minister Vilhula explained that he was approached by Communist Diet member Mauri Ryoma to sign the greetings to the Peace Relay which arrived in Helsinki on April 19th. At the time he was approached by Ryoma the greetings contained three names, Prime Minister Kekkonen, Minister Vesterinen and Minister Tornaren. Ryoma explained that as could be noted from the first three names (all are members of the Board of the Finnish-Soviet Union Society) the greetings were being sponsored by the Finnish-Soviet Union Society. The Minister said that in retrospect it is unfortunate that the Cabinet was not able to discuss the matter of the signatures at a Cabinet meeting. On the other hand, Vilhula said that no one from his party had been critical of the Cabinet's actions in this matter.

Minister Vilhula told a story about President Paasikivi in connection with the Peace Relay at the Hall of Fairs. According to Vilhula, upon receipt of the invitation to attend, the President asked his military aide Colonel Grenvall if it was necessary that the invitation be accepted. His aide stated that he didn't believe it was necessary whereupon the President asked if there were five million troops available to back his stand. The president attended the Peace Relay.

Minister Vilhula clearly indicated that it is the primary goal of the Kekkonen Cabinet to obtain a trade agreement from the Soviet Union and therefore such items as signatures to the Peace Relay greetings became necessary. The Minister gave as his opinion that the Soviets never have a trade policy which is independent from politics or rather that their trade depends upon political considerations. He went on to explain that Finland is in dire need of grain, gasoline and fertilizers from the Soviets. Although gasoline is being obtained from elsewhere, from Italy for example, it has nevertheless already been necessary to mix alcohol with gasoline (Finland has a surplus of sulphite alcohol). Grain from the West is available but requires dollars. Fertilizer from former sources such as Algiers and Egypt are not available at the moment.

During the conversation Minister Vilhula mentioned that Finland had no choice but to try to get along with the Soviets although neither the President nor the present government will allow any action which would reflect upon Finnish independence. He mentioned that Finland was left to the Soviet sphere of influence at Yalta and this position was further confirmed at Potsdam (from time to time this thought is presented by Finns when defending themselves in an awkward situation).

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Minister Vilhula also spoke about collaboration with domestic Communists saying that the Diet election held in July 1948 during the Pekkala government resulted in large gains for the Agrarians and Social Democrats and losses for the Communists. The presidential election held during the encumbency of the Fagerholm Social Democratic government which would make no compromises with the Communists resulted in sizeable gains for the Communists. Thus, from the point of view of the July 1951 elections the Minister thought it may be better not to be too rough on the Communists.

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CRYPTO TELEGRAM *Department of State* F790 ACTION COPY

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Control: 12643
Rec'd: July 28, 1950
10:32 p.m.

FROM: Helsinki

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 43, July 28, 5 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 43; REPEATED INFORMATION MOSCOW 16.

Replying to my inquiry whether Finland had in recent weeks been approached in any manner by Soviets, Foreign Office chief of political branch declared today Soviets had made no approaches either here or at Moscow; moreover that an unnamed Finnish chief of mission had recently informed Foreign Office that his Soviet colleague had declared to him that Finland was fortunate because its position in Northwest Europe would protect it from entanglement in any troubles might develop.

Source also told me that at recent Finnish Legation farewell party at Moscow for First Secretary Fulkdrinen, number of Soviet officials had attended and had been very friendly.

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PER M. JERABEK - EUR
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FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SECURITY: TOP SECRET UNCLASSIFIED

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660c.61/9-150

TO: Department of State

FROM: HELSINKI 160 September 1, 1950

REF: LEGTEL 97, August 24, 1950

SUBJECT: FINN-SOVIET RELATIONS

The afternoon of 26 August the Deputy Chief of the Division of Political Affairs in the Foreign Office told me that the Soviet Minister, General Savonenkov, was calling that afternoon on the Foreign Minister at the Foreign Office.

During conversations which I have had this week with the Chief of the Political Division of the Foreign Office, Minister Vahervouri, and with the Minister of Education, Lennart Heljas, I inquired in both cases specifically whether the Soviet Government, either in Moscow or in Helsinki, had recently placed before the Finn Government any matters which the Finn Government considered at all disturbing. Each informant answered unhesitatingly with a categorical "No." I also inquired of each whether, upon his return to Helsinki from his vacation in the Soviet Union, General Savonenkov had brought any messages to the Finn Government which were in any way disquieting. Each informant again answered unhesitatingly with a categorical "No."

Warren M. Chase
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

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From: Helsinki

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TO: Secretary of State

Control: 9051
Rec'd: November 19, 1950
2:24 p.m.

56

NO: 289, November 19, 5 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 289, REPEATED OSLO UNNUMBERED.

Reference Stockholm 9 to Oslo, repeated information Department 598, November 18.

At request Stockholm, following is relay our 21 November 18 to Stockholm in answer its 15 November 17.

"Reliable informants assure me that Soviets have not recently put any pressure on any Finns and that nothing has taken place in Finland that could remotely justify disquiet at this time. Moreover, we have not discovered any evidence of pressure or other reason for disquiet.

XR 761.5636/11-2250

Rumors of Soviet demands for right construct radar stations West Finland and for strips of territory on common frontier commenced circulating here early this week, but some reliable informants assure me that all are baseless. I am inclined attribute rumors to persons, probably Communists, seeking to influence Diet voting yesterday whether or not withhold confidence from Kekkonen Government. Incidentally, Kekkonen Government saved by Communist votes en bloc. Several times past few years someone has launched rumors Soviet pressure which it would have been Communist interest to have generally believed."

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TELEGRAPH BRANCH

F790005-1085

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Control: 6192
Date: December 13, 1950
12:18 p.m.

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FM: Helsinki

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 332, December 13

Communist newspapers today prominently feature PRAVDA article declaring Social Democratic efforts enter Cabinet are campaign designed to break normal relations between Finland and USSR in order make Finland instrument of Anglo-American aggressive elements and that real power behind Cabinet maneuvers is Tanner. Commie editorial comment parallels PRAVDA line bourgeois press accords unimportant placing to article and HUFVUDSTADSBLADET reports STOCKHOLM TIDNINGEN comment that PRAVDA article is unblushing interference in Finnish internal affairs. SOSIALIDEMOKRAATTI today declares Social Democratic Party Council will probably be convened December 17 to consider Cabinet quest on. Article states there are still divergencies between Social Democrats and Agrarians on economic program.

CABOT

GEM:BJS

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Control: 6930
Rec'd: December 14, 1950
2:14 p.m.

Action EUR

FROM: Moscow

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1189, December 14, 6 p.m.

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Without preliminary build-up PRAVDA Tass on December 11 suddenly informed readers that question of broadening government base in Finland had been extensively discussed there for long time. Asserting that negotiations were ostensibly being conducted with all parties, despatch claimed that in fact goal was only to include Social Democrats in proposed new government. Purpose of inclusion not at all to alter government economic program, but to establish anti-Soviet, pro-West policy. On same day PRAVDA carried excerpts from statement of Democratic Union complaining of exclusion from negotiations despite its announced readiness to join new government. On December 12 PRAVDA observer article covered same ground as previous Tass despatch, elaborating it with attack on Tanner and other SD's; asserted that differences in economic policy among various Finnish parties were subordinate to problem of foreign policy. On December 14 long TRUD article reviewed career of Tanner, "most bitter enemy USSR," and repeated charges of SD plot to establish anti-Soviet policy. On same day most papers carried excerpts from NY DAG article alleging Minister Cabot urged Tanner and Ilesklnen act immediately to overthrow Kekkonen Government, promising assistance in formation new Cabinet. In turn SD's agreed to include Agrarians and other parties. Fear expressed that such a move "will be regarded as a provocation and will lead to serious consequences".

Judging by this Soviet press material, we feel Soviets alarmed by recent Finnish developments and seeking exert pressure to block any change in Kekkonen Government or, if that impossible, to force participation by Democratic Union excluding SD or holding them to minimum. Soviet press has consistently shown tolerant if not cordial attitudes Kekkonen, since his visit here. Embassy does not doubt that Soviets much prefer present bourgeois government to Cabinet influenced by party strongly rivaling Communists in quest for working class votes. Stress on personal vilification of SD leaders, especially Tanner, suggests that in extreme case, Soviets might reconcile themselves to Cabinet including minor SD figures.

RSP:MMG

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